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Abstract: This paper argues that the direct, vertical toleration of certain types of citizen 
by the Rawlsian liberal state is appropriate and required in circumstances in which these 
types of citizen pose a threat to the stability of the state. By countering the claim that 
vertical toleration is redundant given a commitment to the Rawlsian version of the liberal 
democratic ideal, and by articulating a version of that ideal that shows this claim to be 
false, the paper reaffirms the centrality of vertical toleration in the Rawlsian liberal ac-
count of state-citizen relations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Toleration is perhaps the most difficult and necessary of political virtues. 
Without it, justice (however conceived) is unachievable. Political princi-
ples and individual practices of toleration mediate oppositions between 
individuals and groups that endanger peaceful and mutually beneficial 
social cooperation by threatening to erupt into violent conflict, to create 
social segregation, and to breed mutual mistrust. Although not without 
theoretical difficulties, a conception of toleration as a morally valuable 
personal practice is well established in the literature; most people accept 
that, despite being a difficult virtue, personal toleration is not defeated by 
paradox.1 Instead, where the action is in contemporary debates about tol-
eration is the question of whether toleration has a place beyond the inter-
personal—what I shall call the “horizontal”—sphere. Some key theorists 
of toleration deny that there is a place for (what I shall call) “vertical” 
toleration in any political ideal worthy of our allegiance. This claim 

 1For an argument that toleration is paradoxical, see David D. Raphael, “The Intolera-
ble,” in Susan Mendus (ed.), Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspec-
tives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 137-54, esp. pp. 142-43. For 
more nuanced analyses of the difficulty of toleration, see T.M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of 
Tolerance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), or Bernard Williams, “Toler-
ating the Intolerable,” in Susan Mendus (ed.), The Politics of Toleration (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999), pp. 65-76. 
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marks a notable shift in the history of theories of toleration, most of 
which have treated it not only as a valuable personal practice, but also—
and sometimes more importantly—as a valuable political practice en-
gaged in by the state with respect to various of its members.  
 Stated in its liberal form, what I shall mean by vertical toleration is 
this:  
 
The exercise of restraint by political authorities with respect to interfer-
ence with citizens whose practices they oppose (and with whom they 
could interfere) on principled grounds that these practices do not violate 
the liberal rights of any other citizens.2 
 
Toleration is, for good reasons, strongly associated with liberal political 
thinking: the values of most liberalisms prima facie provide normatively 
powerful foundations for the practice of noninterference at the heart of 
vertical toleration. However, it is precisely this claim that some promi-
nent theorists dispute. On their view, vertical toleration has no place in 
contemporary societies governed by a liberal democratic ideal: this ideal 
has made vertical toleration redundant. There are three things to note 
about (what I shall call) “the redundancy claim.” 
 
1. It is a claim about the absence of a context for vertical toleration, rather 
than about the circumstances in which vertical toleration ought to be 
practiced. The claim is that vertical toleration is redundant in the liberal 
political ideal because relations between citizens and political authori-
ties in this ideal have obliterated the context for vertical toleration. 
2. It is a claim about a political ideal and not about political practices 
that are guided by this ideal but often fail to realize it. Existing flawed 
and nondemocratic societies in which a context for vertical toleration 
clearly exists (even if vertical intolerance is the right response in 
many cases) provide no counterexamples to the claim. 
3. It is not the claim that liberal vertical toleration is redundant because 
it has been superseded by a better conception of toleration, for exam-
ple, toleration as recognition.3 

 2Vertical toleration is not the sole preserve of liberal approaches. The values of justice 
justifying the practice of vertical toleration could, for example, be part of a conservative 
vision of just social cooperation whereby the exercise of such restraint by the political au-
thorities is thought to be more likely to encourage the self-dependence and entrepreneurship 
necessary for the continued development of market forces. However, the vast majority of 
contemporary discussions locate toleration in the liberal tradition, and I shall do the same. 
 3See Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); Ingrid Creppell, “Toleration, Politics, and the Role of Mutuali-
ty,” in Melissa Williams and Jeremy Waldron (eds.), Toleration and Its Limits (NOMOS 
XLVIII) (New York: New York University Press, 2008), pp. 315-59. 
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 A recent defense of the redundancy claim is given by Peter Jones: 
“we understand a tolerant regime as one that upholds an ideal of tolera-
tion rather than one that itself tolerates the population whose lives it 
regulates.”4 He argues that vertical toleration is obsolescent for liberals 
given their commitment to a “democratic conception of citizens as peo-
ple who enjoy equal status and equal rights as members of a common 
political community.”5 In contrast, I shall argue that the context for verti-
cal toleration is a central and permanent part of this conception of de-
mocratic political community, and that its practice is, in some circum-
stances, required by a commitment to this ideal conception itself. By de-
scribing cases in which the direct, vertical toleration of particular groups 
of citizens by a regime is possible, permitted, and indeed required, if the 
liberal democratic ideal to which the regime aspires is to be realized, I 
shall refute the redundancy claim. 
 If I am right, then the notable shift in theorizing toleration mentioned 
earlier is on shaky ground whenever it is justified as required by a com-
mitment to the liberal democratic ideal. And this commitment is ubiqui-
tous on the contemporary theoretical scene. Of course, the shift might 
still be justified as part of a political theory distinct from—perhaps hos-
tile to—the liberal democratic ideal,6 and therein lie the limits of the ar-
guments I make in this paper. But if my arguments succeed within these 
limits, then they establish a permanent place for vertical toleration in the 
liberal democratic ideal, and thus reconnect the ideal’s umbilical cord to 
its ancestors in liberal thinking. I shall use Rawls’s version of the liberal 
democratic ideal in making these arguments. Rawls’s vision of a society 
governed by principles of justice as fairness is the most developed of 
such liberal ideals in modern times: showing that vertical toleration has a 
place in this vision brings at least this giant back into the fold of a liberal 
tradition with vertical toleration at its heart. Others might follow.  
 Let me begin by describing an imaginary state called Liberalia.  
 
 
2. Liberalia  
 
The citizens of Liberalia—liberal citizens—are political equals, and view 
themselves as such. Their public debate and legislative decisions are con-
strained by a Constitution that secures for them many important rights, 
liberties, and opportunities. This Constitution is derived from a set of 

 4Peter Jones, “Making Sense of Political Toleration,” British Journal of Political 
Science 37 (2007): 383-402, p. 401. 
 5Ibid., p. 386. 
 6See, for example, Glen Newey, “Toleration, Politics, and the Role of Murality,” in 
Williams and Waldron (eds.), Toleration and Its Limits, pp. 360-91. 
4 Catriona McKinnon 
 
 
principles of justice stating that basic rights, liberties and opportunities 
are to be distributed equally across all citizens, and that economic re-
sources are to be distributed so as to make the worst off among them as 
well off as possible. In Liberalia, all citizens have the same rights to 
freedom of conscience and expression, freedom of movement and asso-
ciation, and political engagement and activism; the same opportunities to 
access education, the various professions, and positions of power and 
status in Liberalia. Liberal citizens call their principles of justice “justice 
as fairness,” and the majority of them go beyond mere passive accep-
tance of these principles as constraints on their social cooperation, and 
actively commit to and assert these principles as the best ones possible 
for them.  
 However, Liberalia is not a society of people all of whom preach and 
practice the liberalism of their political lives in their personal lives. In 
Liberalia, people have a diverse range of visions of the good life, accom-
panied by very different philosophical and metaphysical outlooks. The 
reason why liberal citizens so divided jointly affirm justice as fairness as 
the best for them are twofold. First, they are committed to finding some 
principles of justice on which they can all agree, despite their differ-
ences, and are willing to give one another assurances that they will each 
abide by these principles: they are justice-seekers (after all, the alterna-
tive is war and endless conflict, and no liberal citizen wants that). Sec-
ond, most of them think that the diversity that exists in Liberalia is the 
inevitable outcome of the exercise of human reason in the conditions of 
freedom. Most of them think that when people are free from external 
threat, coercion, manipulation, and oppression, they will naturally come 
to form different opinions on the big questions of philosophy, value and 
religion. They think that it is a fact about human judgment that two peo-
ple reasoning about the same question—for example, the existence of a 
god—can come to form very different opinions without either of them 
having exercised their reason faultily, even though each will believe that 
her own beliefs are true and those of the other are false. In Rawls’s 
terms, they accept the existence of the burdens of judgment, and their 
consequences for political life.7 
 The burdens of judgment make pluralism not only a permanent fact of 
human life, but also (at least potentially) reasonable. The consequences 
of accepting the existence of the burdens of judgment are that political 
argument and justification must be made in terms that could not be re-
jected by a range of people divided by faith, ideology, lifestyle, prefer-
ences, allegiances, and values, and yet nevertheless united in their rea-

 7See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
p. 54. 
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sonableness.8 Most of the people in Liberalia accept that it can be rea-
sonable for others to disagree with them, and as a result view the plural-
ism that exists in Liberalia as inevitable, and not to be regretted. Most 
liberal citizens accept that any principles of justice on which they could 
agree must take account of and reflect the permanence of the reasonable 
disagreement about the big questions of life that exists in Liberalia. 
These procedural constraints have consequences for the content of prin-
ciples fit to govern the shared political life of reasonable people, and jus-
tify—thinks Rawls—a liberal vision of justice as fairness. For example, 
one consequence for political life of acceptance of the burdens of judg-
ment is that all people ought to have equal freedom of conscience, 
thought, worship, and association, so as to allow everyone in Liberalia to 
live as they think best, given their differences. Hence, most citizens of 
Liberalia affirm Rawls’s first principle of justice securing an equal and 
fully adequate scheme of basic liberties for all.9 
 Importantly, most liberal citizens would continue to affirm justice as 
fairness even if the balance of power in Liberalia were to shift such that 
it became possible for them to impose their view of the best way to live 
on other liberal citizens.10 This is because the reasons for which these 
citizens affirm justice as fairness are moral reasons in the sense that they 
are drawn from within their own conceptions of the good; in Rawls’s 
terms, justice as fairness is a “module” in each reasonable conception of 
the good.11 For this reason, reasonable citizens’ commitment to justice as 
fairness will dominate any expedient reasons for rejecting justice as fair-
ness that could come into existence for them if the balance of power 
shifts in their favor so as to make it possible for them to force others to 
live and believe as they do.  

 8There is, of course, a huge amount of debate in the literature on Rawls about what, 
exactly, affirmation of the existence of the burdens of judgment means, and whether it is 
consistent with Rawls’s declared aim of providing justifications for his principles that 
“stay on the surface, philosophically speaking.” John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Politi-
cal not Metaphysical,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 388-414, at p. 395. Key pieces are: 
Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), esp. section 27; 
Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 19 (1990): 3-46; David Estlund, “Making Truth Safe for Democracy,” in David 
Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (eds.), The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 71-100. For my purposes, the cogency of these 
criticisms does not matter: any one, or all, of them could succeed and my arguments in 
subsequent sections showing the place for vertical toleration in the Rawlsian liberal ideal 
would remain unaffected. 
 9See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 331-39. 
 10See ibid., pp. 147-49. 
 11See ibid., pp. 144-45. 
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 My description of Liberalia so far has focused just on what most citi-
zens affirm and accept. But not all people in Liberalia share the major-
ity’s view of the pluralism that exists in their society. Although Liberalia 
is an ideal society, and is viewed as such by most of its citizens, it never-
theless contains some people who do not accept that disagreement on 
some of the big questions can be reasonable, and as a result do not affirm 
justice as fairness as their preferred set of principles for reasons drawn 
from within their own moral compass. In particular, imagine that in Lib-
eralia there is disagreement between the majority and some minority 
groups with respect to how the law ought to treat the Liberalian contro-
versial social practice of wearing bowler hats.  
 In Liberalia, the practice of wearing a bowler hat is exclusive to men, 
and is associated with a religion that was the established one in the soci-
ety that preceded Liberalia in which it was illegal for men to be seen in 
public without a bowler hat. Many people in Liberalia continue to prac-
tice this religion, and many (although not all) men of this religion can be 
seen wearing bowler hats: it is a practice of great significance to many of 
them. The laws of Liberalia remain silent on the practice because the re-
ligion with which it is associated forms part of the pluralism so charac-
teristic of Liberalia, and bowler hat wearing violates no one’s rights; in-
deed, many ideal liberal citizens practice this religion. However, there 
are some liberal citizens who do not want the law to remain silent on the 
practice of bowler hat wearing. One group hankers for a return to the 
earlier state: they think that anyone who does not share their religion ex-
ercises their reason in faulty ways, and that the Constitution and laws of 
a society should as a result reflect their religious values and make alter-
native religious practices impossible. The “milliners” want bowler hat 
wearing in public places to be legally required of all men. A separate 
group has an opposing opinion: the “secularists” think that the freedoms 
protected in Liberalia should not include the freedom to wear a bowler 
hat. The secularists think that true freedom of religion for all is secure 
only when public and political life is purged of all religious symbolism 
and practice; as a result, they call for a legal ban on bowler hat wearing 
in public.12 The milliners and the secularists are as opposed to one an-
other as they are to justice as fairness.  
 
 
 
 
 

 12A careful and subtle analysis of the varieties of secularism according to which such 
arguments might be made is Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). I take no account here of the subtleties she identifies. 
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3. Neutrality and Vertical Toleration in Liberalia 
 
In Liberalia, then, there are three groups divided on the question of 
bowler hat wearing and the law: milliners, secularists, and the reasonable 
majority who commit to justice as fairness for moral reasons, and whose 
support for the state realizing this vision of justice secures stability. 
 Given a commitment to justice as fairness, the law should remain si-
lent on the practice of bowler hat wearing, i.e. what the secularists and 
the milliners want is ruled out in a just society. But this is not my focus 
here. Rather, in order to address the redundancy claim made by Jones, I 
shall ask: how should the majority in Liberalia authorise their political 
representatives to treat the milliners and the secularists? There are at 
least two liberal ideals to which they might appeal in giving such direc-
tion: neutrality, and vertical toleration. As already stated, vertical tolera-
tion is: 
 
The exercise of restraint by political authorities with respect to interfer-
ence with citizens whose practices they oppose (and with whom they 
could interfere) on principled grounds that these practices do not violate 
the liberal rights of any other citizens. 
 
If vertical toleration is the ideal that governs the treatment of milliners 
and secularists in Liberalia, then political authorities oppose what they 
do, have the power to interfere with it, but do not exercise this power for 
the principled reason that what the milliners and secularists do violates 
no one’s rights. 
 Turning to neutrality, this relates to the “common ground” between 
people participating in an overlapping consensus of justice as fairness in 
conditions of reasonable pluralism.13 Neutrality (Rawls calls it “neutral-
ity of aim”)14 does not discriminate between people with permissible 
conceptions of the good (judged as such by reference to justice as fair-
ness) in (a) the distribution of opportunities to pursue a conception of the 
good, and (b) with respect to the distribution of assistance to take advan-
tage of these opportunities. In other words, neutrality of aim ensures 
equal opportunity for all to pursue their (permissible) conception of the 
good, and an equal distribution of assistance to enjoy these opportunities 
(which might, of course, mean no assistance is given to anyone).15  
 If neutrality is the ideal that governs the treatment of milliners and 
secularists in Liberalia, then, if what the milliners and secularists do vio-

 13Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 192. 
 14See ibid., pp. 192-93. 
 15See ibid., pp. 193-94. 
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lates no one’s rights (as laid down by justice as fairness), the political 
authorities have no grounds for opposing what they do because what they 
do is not impermissible according to the “common ground” at the heart 
of an overlapping consensus. This fact means that the political authorities 
are not permitted to interfere with the milliners and secularists. 
 Both ideals—vertical toleration and neutrality—require that the state 
does not interfere with the milliners and secularists. However, this is not 
what is at issue in making or rejecting the redundancy claim. Rather, 
what matters is how the justification of state noninterference ought to be 
conceived: what is the ideal that justifies it? On Jones’s view, neutrality 
fills up all the space in relations between political authorities and citi-
zens. It is a requirement of this neutrality, he thinks, that the ideal of tol-
eration is realized in key social and political institutions, enabling the 
tolerant resolution of conflict between individuals in opposition to one 
another. For him, the neutral state acts as a kind of referee in disputes 
between opposed parties, and its institutions aim at conflict resolution 
through toleration. But political authorities themselves must, insofar as 
they are neutral, abstain from opposition towards their citizens; thus, the 
institutions and procedures they create and maintain to enable conflict 
resolutions between citizens are not themselves instruments of opposi-
tion.16 Because vertical toleration is a response to the direct opposition of 
the state to (some of) its citizens, it is obsolete in the ideal liberal polity 
wherein political authorities conform to the principle of neutrality. Neu-
trality obviates state-citizen opposition and so destroys the context for 
vertical toleration. On this view, neutrality has supplanted vertical tolera-
tion, and rendered it redundant. 
 I think this objection to vertical toleration has some purchase, in some 
contexts. I also think that the ideal of neutrality is a valuable part of the 
liberal ideal. However—pace Jones—I disagree that neutrality fills up all 
the political space of state-citizen relations in an ideal society, because 
what (certain types of) milliners and secularists do generates legitimate 
opposition towards them on the part of political authorities also commit-
ted to the ideal of neutrality with respect to other types of acts. It is true 
that in Liberalia, the vertical toleration of citizens towards whom the po-
litical authorities are required to be neutral is obsolescent. Neutrality re-
quires withholding the opposition to which toleration responds, and so 
contexts for neutrality cannot be contexts for toleration. However, neu-
trality has limits, even in Liberalia: political authorities there are not re-

 16“[W]e should not look for the disapproval that is essential to the idea of toleration 
within the rules and institutions of the tolerant society. Rather that disapproval will be 
located in the population whose lives the rules and institutions regulate.” Jones, “Making 
Sense of Political Toleration,” p. 389. 
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quired to be neutral towards all their citizens across the whole range of 
values they hold, and with respect to all the ways in which they pursue 
goals informed by these values. I shall claim that the place for vertical 
toleration in Liberalia is beyond the limits of neutrality, and that there are 
contexts in which neutrality is not appropriate that are contexts for verti-
cal toleration. Showing this will show that neutrality and vertical tolera-
tion are complementary parts of the liberal ideal as a whole, and will 
achieve the reconnection of the (Rawlsian version of) the liberal ideal 
with its roots. It will also prompt some important reflections on what it is 
to think in terms of political ideals, and why they matter. To see all of 
this, let us return to the question of bowler hats. 
 
 
4. Liberalia Revisited 
 
The milliners want bowler hat wearing to be legally required; the secu-
larists want to ban it. How should the ideal liberal citizens of Liberalia 
authorize their political agents to treat the milliners and the secularists? 
A key issue is whether the milliners or secularists act on their declared 
political aims by trying to take the law into their own hands. Perhaps 
some of the secularists use force to knock bowler hats off the heads of 
those they see wearing them, or verbally intimidate and insult men they 
see wearing bowler hats in the street. And perhaps some of the milliners 
form cadres who attack men not wearing bowler hats in public. When 
either the milliners or the secularists act in these ways, they violate the 
basic rights of the men they target, as defined by justice as fairness, 
which include the right to physical integrity and the right to freedom of 
expression (including dress). When milliners or secularists do these 
things in Liberalia, they perform violent crimes. 
 With respect to violent milliners or secularists, the liberal state quite 
rightly acts to prevent them from committing crimes, and prosecutes and 
punishes them when they do. Do criminally violent milliners and secular-
ists provide a context for vertical toleration in the ideal liberal state? The 
nature of the criminal acts not tolerated in these cases makes this an un-
promising line of argument against the redundancy objection. Liberalia is 
an ideal world in which everyone is willing to abide by just laws. But 
this is precisely what the criminal milliners and secularists are not will-
ing to do: they violate the rights to physical integrity and freedom of ex-
pression of bowler hat wearing and bareheaded men. And they do so de-
liberately and with forethought as a way of pursuing their unreasonable 
conceptions of the good. Of course, there are many real-world and non-
ideal examples of intolerance of criminals such as these by states that at 
least claim to be liberal and democratic. But as I noted in the Introduc-
10 Catriona McKinnon 
 
 
tion, this does not impugn the redundancy claim, which concerns only 
the constitution and values of the liberal ideal. Because criminally vio-
lent milliners and secularists are ipso facto unreasonable, and thus prop-
erly thought of as absent from that ideal, they provide no counterexample 
to the redundancy claim. 
 This granted, it is nevertheless important to note that some types of 
criminality are not inconsistent with citizenship—even fully reasonable 
citizenship—in Liberalia. Liberalia is an ideal liberal world because the 
majority of its reasonable citizens uphold and affirm (for moral reasons) 
a conception of justice as fairness, and are willing to abide by laws de-
rived from this conception. But even in a world entirely populated by 
fully reasonable people in this sense, some crimes may be committed. 
For example, inadvertently imposing risks on, and/or causing harm to, 
others in breach of a duty of care owed to them, and as a result of a lack 
of foresight, could provide the mens rea for a variety of crimes in Liber-
alia. That a person is guilty of criminal negligence does not establish that 
she is not willing to propose and abide by fair terms of social coopera-
tion: negligence is an omission, and is consistent with being committed 
in general terms to just principles of social cooperation at the highest 
level. The ideal state of Liberalia is not a fairytale world populated by 
people who never do wrong. In Liberalia, neutrality is to be practiced 
towards people insofar as their comprehensive (moral, religious, philoso-
phical) doctrines are reasonable. But to be a criminal is to have per-
formed an act, of some description (often, a rights-violating act). As the 
example of negligence shows, being a criminal need have nothing to do 
with the nature and content of one’s beliefs, the doctrines that inform 
them, or willingness to abide by fair principles of cooperation. Instead, 
criminality can relate to failures of conduct judged as such in virtue of 
faults such as negligence: I can be fully willing to abide by principles of 
cooperation I judge to be fair by reference to my reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrine, and yet unintentionally violate particular standards of con-
duct derived from these principles. Thus it is possible, in Liberalia, for 
reasonable criminals to fall within the scope both of the ideal of neutral-
ity—insofar as their doctrines and dispositions are reasonable—and of 
the ideal of vertical toleration, insofar as what they do is judged to be 
(criminally) impermissible by (ultimate) reference to principles of jus-
tice, and so beyond the limits of toleration. The ideal citizens of Liberalia 
meet constraints of reasonableness that relate to how they conceive of 
their differences with others (the burdens of judgment), and how they are 
willing to manage them (a sense of justice); action so constrained may 
nevertheless sometimes cause wrongful harm of which the authorities are 
rightly (vertically) intolerant. This is the first way of showing that the 
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conditions of vertical toleration exist even in Liberalia, wherein the ideal 
of neutrality governs relations between the state and citizens insofar as 
they have reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and a general willingness 
to abide by fair principles of social cooperation.  
 Turning now to noncriminal, law-abiding milliners and secularists in 
Liberalia, they do not cause wrongful harm to others, nor violate any-
one’s rights, but stand opposed in their beliefs and values to Liberalia’s 
political ideals and principles. This does not render them criminal: there 
are no thought-crimes in Liberalia. What I shall call “passive” milliners 
and secularists reject the permanence of reasonable pluralism and as a 
consequence want the liberal state to promote their own ends and values 
even though this would crowd out opportunities for others to do the 
same. They need not be thought of as motivated by prejudice or malice. 
It may be that they wish no direct ill to others: their principal aim is to 
build a state in their own image, and they may give little thought to, or 
simply be indifferent towards, what the consequences of that would be 
for those unlike them. Or they may be paternalists: they might think that 
it would be better for these others to convert to their religion, or to aban-
don their outdated religious worldview. Although the passive milliners 
and secularists do not actively seek to harm those they oppose (they obey 
the law, and so on), and so pose no imminent threat to security,17 they 
nevertheless do actively seek to convert others to their way of thinking 
and would practice oppression if they had the political power to do so. 
The passive milliners and secularists commit to justice as fairness for 
expedient reasons, but do not commit to it on morally principled 
grounds; in other words, they commit to justice as fairness as a modus 
vivendi given their present lack of political power to practice intoler-
ance.18 The political conception of justice as fairness is not a module in 
their worldview, but rather, at best, is something they accept that they 
must put up with, given their present lack of power. Their reasons for 
complying with just laws are principled, but not moral.  
 The activities of passive milliners and secularists, albeit lawful, pose 

 17It is for this reason that the treatment of passive milliners and secularists is not de-
termined by Rawls’s remarks on citizens who are politically unreasonable insofar as their 
exercise of liberty of conscience poses a “reasonably certain or imminent” threat to the 
public order and stability necessary for everyone else’s freedom of conscience. Rawls 
claims that these citizens lie outside of the limits of toleration because the state has an 
“enabling right” to interfere with them in order to perform “its duty of impartially sup-
porting the conditions necessary for everyone’s pursuit of his interests and living up to 
his obligations as he understands them.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.187. 
 18Cf. Noah Feldman, “Morality, Self-Interest, and the Politics of Toleration,” in Wil-
liams and Waldron (eds.), Toleration and Its Limits, pp. 392-405. 
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a nascent threat to the roots of Liberalia’s stability. For this reason, the 
state ought to oppose them. To see why, consider what makes Liberalia 
stable over time, as a way of seeing what the passive milliners and secu-
larists threaten to damage. 
 In Liberalia, the majority of citizens affirm justice as fairness for rea-
sons derived from their own conceptions of the good, which are diverse 
and divided. The political and social institutions required and permitted 
by principles of justice as fairness—both organs of the state, and sponta-
neous organizations that evolve in civil society—create a social world 
delivering what Rawls calls “the good of political society”19 to liberal 
citizens. It is this good that motivates them to act in accordance with, 
uphold, or defend these institutions, if necessary.20 A key good-making 
feature of political society structured by justice as fairness is its equal 
provision of the social bases of self-respect to all citizens.21 As Rawls 
stressed throughout his life’s work, self-respect is “perhaps the most im-
portant primary good.”22 Self-respect combines self-value with self-
confidence in a way essential for well-being and practical reasoning 
aimed at the good life, however that is understood by the agent. Self-
value is a matter of nonsubservience, and self-confidence is assured by 
the achievement of congruence between self-conception and self-
expression in at least some areas of life of importance to the person, and 
also often by participation in communities of shared interests in which 
this achievement is recognized and esteemed by similar others.23 Many 
life plans informed by diverse conceptions of the good can provide a 
context for self-respect so long as those who pursue them realize signifi-
cant self-set goals, and are not subservient to anyone else. The signifi-
cance of self-respect as a natural primary good is registered in the inclu-
sion of the social bases of self-respect on the list of social primary goods, 

 19Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), p. 198. 
 20For example, through voting in accordance with the common good, paying taxes, or 
undertaking civil disobedience, when the circumstances require it. 
 21A further good is the achievement of intergenerational justice (see Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness, p. 201). Also important, although hardly ever mentioned in analyses of Rawls, 
is fraternity, whereby by joining together in a just society people “agree to share one 
another’s fate.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), p. 102; see also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., pp. 90-91. An instruc-
tive exception is David Estlund, “Liberalism, Equality, and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique 
of Rawls,” Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1998): 99-112. 
 22Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 440. See also pp. 92, 107, 443, 543-45, and Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, pp. 106, 203, 318, 319. 
 23See Catriona McKinnon, Liberalism and the Defence of Political Constructivism 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), chap. 3. See also Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy 
and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. chaps. 1 and 2. 
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which provide the currency of justice as fairness. The social bases of 
self-respect are a set of opportunities for people (with a diversity of rea-
sonable conceptions of the good informing their life plans) to develop 
self-respect through their behavior and interaction with others. 
 
[S]elf-respect depends upon and is encouraged by certain public features of basic social 
institutions, how they work together and how people who accept these arrangements are 
expected to (and normally do) regard and treat one another. These features of basic insti-
tutions and publicly expected (and normally honored) ways of conduct are the social 
bases of self-respect.24 
 
 Although self-respect cannot be provided directly with political 
measures,25 political and social conditions can present severe obstacles to 
it such that whole swathes of persons are systematically damaged. Caste 
systems, segregation, class divisions, rigid gender roles, and other forms 
of social hierarchies are the most obvious forms of social organization 
that cause such harm. In these cases people in less privileged groups are 
(inter alia) viewed and treated as having less value than those who op-
press and dominate them; and this can affect the self-conceptions of the 
oppressed in ways damaging to self-respect (evinced in the “Uncle Tom” 
figure).26 In addition, more subtle forms of injustice related to distribu-
tional inequalities can deprive people of the social bases of self-respect 
by creating social exclusion and inequalities of opportunity for them to 
develop and refine their talents.  
 There are many ways in which Liberalia provides its citizens with the 
social bases of self-respect, from ensuring equal rights to freedom of as-
sociation and expression for all, to guaranteeing equality of opportunity 
to attain positions of political, economic, and cultural power and influ-
ence, to operationalizing forums for political debate in public reason that 
are maximally inclusive and prioritize no one conception of the good 
over any other.27 However, what matters for my purposes here is Rawls’s 
claim that “[i]n securing these things political society answers to [citi-
zens’] fundamental needs.”28 The delivery to citizens of goods such as 
the social bases of self-respect is the catalyst that enables the theoretical 
justification of principles of justice as fairness also to serve as the source 
of citizens’ allegiance to the institutions so justified. Without allegiance 

 24Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 319. 
 25See Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 60. 
 26For discussion of the “Uncle Tom” figure, see Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Self-Respect, 
chap. 2. 
 27For an excellent discussion, see Joshua Cohen, “Democratic Equality,” Ethics 99 
(1989): 727-51, p. 737. See also McKinnon, Liberalism and the Defence of Political 
Constructivism, chapt. 5. 
 28Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 200. 
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with these roots and this character, the maintenance and replication of 
these institutions over time through the collective and free will of citi-
zens who view these institutions “as one of the significant achievements 
of their history” would not be possible.29 In Liberalia, just institutions 
endure because they command the support of those whose lives are struc-
tured by them: stability grows from the ground up, and is rooted in citi-
zens’ own conceptions of the good, which justice as fairness promotes. 
This support is freely given down the generations because, in delivering 
goods such as the social bases of self-respect to all, political institutions 
answer to the social needs of people who view themselves as free and 
equal, and yet are reasonably divided on the big questions, and who de-
sire to live together peacefully and profitably. As Rawls puts it, “those 
who grow up under just basic institutions—institutions that justice as 
fairness itself enjoins—acquire a reasoned and informed allegiance to 
those institutions sufficient to render them stable.”30  
 What has all of this to do with the passive milliners and secularists, 
and the liberal state’s relation to them? The passive milliners and secu-
larists pose no imminent threat to public order, or to anyone’s rights, and 
thus cannot be interfered with by the liberal state in the name of protect-
ing public order, safety, and the conditions necessary for equal liberty. 
However, their agitation to convert others to their commitment to op-
pression could erode the support given to the liberal state by its citizens 
by convincing them that adjustments to the liberal limits of toleration are 
required so as to exclude certain groups (either those who wear hats, or 
those who don’t, depending on which group is doing the talking).  
 Imagine that the secularists were to successfully recruit erstwhile 
fully reasonable people to their cause of lobbying to have bowler hat 
wearing made illegal, perhaps by (within their rights to freedom of ex-
pression) promoting racial and cultural stereotypes, and by stoking up 
fear and suspicion on the back of this. My claim is not that the threat to 
Liberalia’s stability in these circumstances relates to any violation of the 
rights of bowler hat-wearing men: the promotion of such stereotypes is 
legally permitted in Liberalia,31 and the lobbying will—quite rightly—
never succeed. The law and political institutions in Liberalia are legiti-

 29Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 204. 
 30Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p. 185. 
 31Of course, there are many cans of worms here related to, for example, whether of-
fense counts as harm from a liberal perspective, and/or whether racist speech can be an 
illocutionary speech act that does something to those it smears from which the law ought 
to protect them. See McKinnon, Toleration, chaps. 7-10, for discussion. For my purposes 
here, all that has to be true of the law in Liberalia is that it permits some racist speech in 
some circumstances, creating the possibility of address to others, however limited. I take 
this to be uncontroversial. 
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mate because they realize principles of justice as fairness that could not 
be rejected by free and equal people in conditions of reasonable plural-
ism. The emergence of a substantial unreasonable minority (or even a 
majority, or the entirety) of citizens in Liberalia who oppose the law and 
political institutions with this character leaves their legitimacy un-
touched. My claim about stability is, rather, that the emergence of such 
groups degrades and damages the bottom-up allegiance given to the state 
by citizens, without which the maintenance of just institutions will re-
quire top-down force and coercion. It does this in at least two ways. First, 
and most simply, the number of citizens freely giving their allegiance to 
the just state is reduced. Second, and possibly more damaging, those 
whose freedoms are questioned (the bowler hat-wearing men) by the 
emerging substantial minority have their social bases of self-respect de-
pleted when fellow citizens aim to deny to them freedoms they claim for 
themselves. For bowler hat-wearing men, the emergence of such a mi-
nority makes it clear to them that many of their fellow citizens do not 
view them as free and equal, and are not willing to exchange reasons 
with them—in particular, are not willing to engage with their own ac-
counts of the significance of bowler hat wearing to them—in justificatory 
debate about the legal limits of freedom of expression. The failure of ci-
vility on the part of the emerging minority risks undermining the social 
bases of self-respect for those they oppose by damaging mutual recogni-
tion in public political debate, which supports the convictions of all par-
ties that others accept them as free and equal citizens, notwithstanding 
their religious and cultural differences.32  
 These are the senses in which the passive milliners and secularists 
pose a threat to stability in Liberalia. What the passive milliners and 
secularists do constitutes a direct, albeit permissible, attack on Liber-
alia’s stability. Importantly, this is the case not simply because the pas-
sive milliners and secularists reject the burdens of judgment at the heart 
of the justification of justice as fairness. Rather, the attack is on the 
foundations of stability in the present support political authorities have 
among the reasonable majority of citizens in Liberalia. The liberal state 
affirms principles and ideals that generate and perpetuate this support, 
and will quite properly use the law to protect these ideals qua stability 
generators. As Rawls puts it, 
 
[A] constitutional regime [may take] certain steps to strengthen the virtues of toleration 
and mutual trust, say by discouraging various kinds of religious and racial discrimination 
(in ways consistent with liberty of conscience and freedom of speech) … [and in so do-

 32For discussion of civility, see Catriona McKinnon, “Civil Citizens,” in Catriona 
McKinnon and Iain Hampsher-Monk (eds.), The Demands of Citizenship (London: Con-
tinuum, 2000), pp. 144-64. 
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ing] it is taking reasonable measures to strengthen the forms of thought and feeling that 
sustain fair social cooperation between its citizens regarded as free and equal.33 
 
Such measures might include educating children to the knowledge that 
apostasy is not a crime in Liberalia,34 or enacting legislation making ra-
cial discrimination in employment practices illegal. However, what the 
state will not do is prevent the passive milliners and secularists from pub-
licly expressing their opinions on bowler hat wearing and law, or from 
recruiting people to lobby groups with the aim of changing the law, de-
spite the fact that the state has the power to prevent them from doing 
these things, and despite the fact that this is exactly what they aim to do 
to others, and so are in no position to complain if they themselves are 
oppressed.35  
 Two of the basic rights all people in Liberalia have are to freedom of 
expression and freedom of association. In Liberalia, these freedoms are 
extended to the passive milliners and secularists, despite the fact that this 
creates the risk that the conditions necessary for the allegiance the liberal 
state requires for stability will be undermined. The restraint of political 
authorities in Liberalia is justified on principled grounds by reference to 
the importance of protecting the conditions enabling each person to live 
as she sees fit, for example, through upholding a principle of equal lib-
erty. In other words, that freedoms such as freedom of speech and asso-
ciation are extended to intolerant citizens in Liberalia shows that there is 
still scope for such states to practice vertical toleration with respect to 
some of their citizens, for example, the passive milliners and secularists. 
So long as passively intolerant people remain in Liberalia—indeed, so 
long as there is any possibility of their existence—the circumstances of 
vertical toleration with respect to some sets of citizens will continue to 
exist in this place. Thus, at least with respect to Liberalia, the redundancy 
objection is defeated. 
 
 
5. Ideal Theory 
 
By way of conclusion I shall indicate some additional attractions of my 
argument that extend beyond internecine disagreements between Rawl-
sians—and even liberals per se—and which relate to the point of having 
political ideals.  
 One way in which to respond to my defeat of the redundancy claim is 
to argue that passive milliners and secularists have no place in Liberalia, 

 33Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 195. 
 34See ibid., p. 199. 
 35See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., pp. 192-93, for discussion. 
 Vertical Toleration as a Liberal Ideal 17 
 
 


because they are not fully reasonable. This addresses only one part of my 
argument for vertical toleration as a liberal ideal, and it leaves untouched 
my claim that reasonable criminals are properly thought of as citizens of 
Liberalia. Although I agree that the passive milliners and secularists are 
only partially reasonable, I offer two reflections to support my claim that 
they, too, are properly thought of as part of Liberalia’s population. 
 First, in Liberalia people are willing to obey statutes and regulations 
derived from principles of justice. And the passive milliners and secular-
ists do just that: what they do conforms to the requirements of justice, 
even though their reasons for action are not moral reasons. The fact that 
passive milliners and secularists act for reasons of expediency does not 
make them criminals, because they nevertheless obey the law. And there 
are no thought-crimes in Liberalia.  
 Furthermore, the impulse to define the ideal context as one in which 
people not only do the right thing, but also always for the right reasons, 
risks misconstruing the purpose of using this context as a starting point 
for thinking about politics. Laying out a blueprint for an ideal liberal so-
ciety is interesting only insofar as it is useful, that is, can help us in con-
structing a theory of transitional justice to move us from where we are to 
closer to the ideal,36 “to guide the course of social reform.”37 Theorizing 
away people like the passive milliners and secularists leaves us with an 
impotent political ideal in this respect. The context for vertical toleration 
is an indispensable and permanent part of any ideal fit to guide thinking 
in the present.  
 Second, when people affirm justice for reasons of expediency—as do 
the passive milliners and secularists—we get closer to the ideal than 
when they abandon compliance altogether. And there are good reasons to 
think about the political treatment such people are owed by keeping them 
as part of the population of Liberalia. Consider Rawls’s remarks that  
 
The liberties of the intolerant may persuade them to a belief in freedom … provided that 
[an intolerant sect] is not so strong initially that it can impose its will straightaway, or 
does not grow so rapidly that the psychological principle has no time to take hold, it will 
tend to lose its intolerance and accept liberty of conscience.38  
 
Rawls thinks—perhaps better, hopes—that those who start off by affirm-
ing principles of justice as a modus vivendi will be transformed into fully 
reasonable citizens providing greater stability for the just liberal state: 
“the ideal of citizenship can be learned and may elicit an effective desire 

 36See Ingrid Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” Social Theory and 
Practice 34 (2008): 341-62. 
 37Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., p. 215. 
 38Ibid., pp. 192-93.  
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to be that kind of person.”39 Unless vertical toleration is practiced with 
respect to people like the passive milliners and secularists, then this hope 
is dashed; but unless we include such people in the liberal ideal polity, 
we lose principled arguments for tolerating them that are consistent with 
—indeed, derived from—liberal ideals. If we conceive of Liberalia as 
exhaustively populated by fully reasonable people who unanimously 
agree on justice as fairness for moral reasons—that is, as a place in 
which neutrality fills up all the space of politics—then Liberalia is noth-
ing but a pretty fantasy, and the worst suspicions of self-styled hard-
nosed people who wonder what political philosophy has to do with the 
“real world” may be confirmed.40 
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 39Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 71. 
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